Afghans may wonder why foreigners repeatedly invade their country before, invariably, scrambling for the exit. In 1842, the massacre of a retreating British army that had conquered the country four years earlier should have prevented Britain from trying – and failing – twice more, in 1878 and 1919. Next came the Soviet Union. Its triumphant conquest of 1979 ended ten years later in humiliation. The “exceptionalism” of the US proved less than exceptional in 2021, when its armed forces, having lingered for a record two decades, departed in such a hurry that they left thousands of their local collaborators behind. Despite the expenditure of $1 trillion and the loss of 2,311 American and an estimated 95,000 Afghan lives, America’s long-term impact was as negligible as Britain’s and Russia’s. Soon, it will be China’s turn. If Xi Jinping goes for it, my money is on the Afghans.
Jon Lee Anderson, whose excellent New Yorker frontline dispatches are collected in To Lose a War, sympathizes with the Afghans’ predicament. They owe their woes not only to foreigners, but to homegrown warriors:
Continue reading →“In a forty-five-year period, they have lived through a decades-long Russian military occupation followed by a police state dictatorship followed by a bloody civil war followed by a six-year Taliban tyranny followed by twenty years of a western-leaning quasi-democracy, only to revert to Taliban control.”


